

2 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Coverage of the Intelligence and
Policy-Making Processes in OTR
Courses

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, the "intelligence process" is considered in the conventional sense of the intelligence cycle--i.e., the process from generation of requirements at any level to the collection of intelligence information, its translation where needed from foreign language to English, blips or images to narrative, etc., dissemination and analysis, and finally the production of finished intelligence.

Acknowledging that "policy-making" occurs on many levels and in many agencies of the U.S. Government, I have focused primarily on the national level as represented by the National Security Council system in support of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This is consistent with the President's affirmation in his 1972 report on foreign policy to Congress that,

"One of my first acts as President was to reaffirm the role of the National Security Council as the principal forum for Presidential review, coordination, and control of U.S. Government activity in the field of national security and foreign affairs...All parts of the NSC system have as their common purpose to provide me with a clear statement of the issues, realistic options for dealing with them, and the implications of each option for our long term objectives."

The term "Intelligence Community" or simply "Community" in this paper refers to the USIB system.

Schedule references are from the most recent runnings of each course.

II. SCHOOL OF INTELLIGENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS (SIWA)

A. Intelligence in World Affairs (IWA)

(Four week EOD course for Agency professionals)

The Intelligence in World Affairs course is the basic orientation for new professionals in CIA. Therefore the principal emphases are on a fundamental understanding of the meaning and role of "intelligence" in our political system, and an awareness of the organization and responsibilities of CIA. The interface between the intelligence and foreign policy-making processes is outlined, and the roles of other Community members explained. But the course is predominantly about the intelligence cycle within the Agency.

The first objective is stated as,

"Introduce you to the fundamentals of intelligence and to relate the intelligence process to United States foreign policy."

STATINTL
STATINTL

This was the explicit focus of the first day in the 1 1/2 hour lectures by SIWA faculty members [redacted] ("The Role and Tasks of U.S. Intelligence") and [redacted] ("Intelligence and Policy"). Larry reviewed historically the events leading to recognition on the part of the Executive of the need for a coordinated Intelligence Community to support the alerting and policy-making processes. He then focused on the broad responsibilities of CIA and the Community in fulfilling this role. Paul described the structures of the USIB and NSC systems, and distinguished the functions of the component members of each.

The remainder of the course concentrated on CIA, with relevant coverages following essentially "organizational/functional" lines. The cycle was treated as follows:

Two days on the DDO which included clandestine collection activities;

One day on collection, introduced by a SIWA faculty member, explaining the generation of collection requirements. One hour presentations followed on OEL, [REDACTED] by office representatives. SB/DDO, in "The View of Collection from Headquarters," stressed the continuing need for "human collection" in an era of increasingly sophisticated technical collection systems.

STAT

Approximately 1 1/2 days on production, including a student exercise requiring that each write an item for the Current Intelligence Bulletin based on intelligence information provided. One hour presentations on Estimative and Current Intelligence, 1 1/2 hour lecture on Economic Intelligence and a two hour consideration of Scientific and Technical Intelligence were given by representatives from ONE, OCI, OER and OSI respectively. A SIWA faculty member, [REDACTED] presented one hour on "The Exploitation of Imagery."

STAT

The lectures on collection and production activities were presented in the context of the total cycle, particularly with regard to sources of requirements and prime consumers.

A third subject area tangential but critical to the intelligence process is that of preparing the collector or analyst to perceive his target on its own terms. This problem was addressed directly in several presentations:

One day block by SIWA faculty on "Problems of Perception and Communication";

Explicit emphasis in the following geographic area coverages:

"The Third World as an Intelligence Target" (1 1/2 hrs), [REDACTED]
NE/DDO;

STAT

"Latin America—Analytical Concerns"
(1 1/2 hrs), [redacted] SIWA;

STAT
STAT

"The Middle East Today" (1 1/2 hrs),
[redacted] C/NEA/OCI;

STAT

Presentations by SIWA faculty in 1 1/2
day blocks on the USSR and the PRC.

In sum, IWA provides a basic understanding of the intelligence process as it operates within CIA. The limited experience and knowledge of the majority of students of the fundamental elements of either the intelligence cycle or the responsibilities of CIA makes these first priority concerns. SIWA is in the midst of reorganizing segments of the course, and anticipates greater attention given to policy-making.

B. Midcareer

(Six week course for Agency officers, GS-12/14)

The Midcareer course is divided into three phases—the Managerial Grid, the Agency (organization, missions and problems, as well as management concerns), and the Intelligence Community and World Affairs.

The last two phases have several presentations relevant to this paper. The concern with management problems has resulted in the course being structured along "organizational/functional" lines.

Phase II opened with Charles Briggs, C/OPPB, addressing the theme, "The Agency and Intelligence Community—Developments and Problems." Presentations dealing with elements of the cycle that followed were:

"Developments in Photographic Intelligence"
(2 1/2 hrs), Arthur Lundahl, C/NPIC;

Two days on the DDO, opened with an overview by the DD/O, followed by discussions of the role of the field station and the area division. Remaining concerns were specific targets [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

STATINTL

STATINTL

One day on the DDS&T, opened by the DD/S&T. He was followed by the directors of the following offices speaking on their responsibilities, including those for collection and/or analysis: R&D, OSP, OEL, OSI and FMSAC;

One hour presentations by the directors of [REDACTED] and OBGI;

One hour presentations and participation in a two-hour panel by the directors of OSR, OER, and OCI. That evening the DDI led a discussion on his directorate.

Participants in the above presentations often took part in less formal discussion sessions after dinner.

In Phase III, topics included issues facing the policy-makers, and CIA's role in interface with the latter and other Community members. These included:

"The Agency's Role in Narcotics Control" (1 hr), [REDACTED], C/NARCOG;

STATINTL

"SALT Negotiations and Monitoring" (1 hr), [REDACTED] Special Assistant to the DCI for SALT.

STATINTL

Also relevant to the intelligence cycle in CIA were:

STATINTL

"Computer Applications in CIA" (1 hr), [REDACTED] C/IPS/OPPB. This was a consideration of the uses of computers in all directorates, including analyst exploitation for computation and data storage and retrieval;

"New Approaches to National Intelligence Estimating" (1 hr), Ramsey Forbush, DD/ONE. Forbush discussed the new formats for ONE production, including the emphasis on presentation and evaluation of options for the policy-maker.

Phase III also included presentations by representatives from other Agencies serving the policy-makers in the intelligence process. These were the Treasury Department, FBI, DIA, INR (State), and a tour of NSA.

Mrs. Jeanne Davis, Staff Secretary, NSC, spoke on the NSC system (1 1/2 hrs). The Intelligence Community Staff was described by Lt. Gen. Lewis Allen, D/DCI/IC and a panel of IC staff members in a 3-hour block. Thus the interface of the intelligence and policy-making processes was considered at the highest level.

The DCI concluded the course with a discussion of overall Agency and Community missions and attendant problems.

The Midcareer course serves the dual purpose of providing perspective on both collection and production issues and management concerns, largely through the eyes of the component directors/chiefs.

The length of the course also permits each student to make a short formal presentation on his own responsibilities, or "a working level view." Additionally, there is a continual informal sharing of experience and concerns. The middle-level OSI scientist-analyst, DDO case officer, OL support officer and OCI political analyst are meeting in an open environment rarely available on the job. The "now let me tell you what it's REALLY like" aspect of ALL cross-Directorate courses should be counted a significant learning experience.

C. Advanced Intelligence Seminar (AIS)

(Three week course for Agency officers, GS-13/15)

The Advanced Intelligence Seminar is predominantly concerned with the intelligence process and its relationship to policy-making. The methodology emphasizes a problem/process

approach. Later segments—particularly those concerned with other Community members—do follow organization/functional lines.

STAT The overview was provided the second day of the course in "How We Fit Into the National Security Process" (1 1/2 hrs) by [redacted] Lectures and discussions following that emphasized the problem/process approach were:

"Intelligence Product and Consumer Needs: The Pak-India Story" (2 hrs), Andrew Marshall, Director, Net Assessment Group, NSC Staff;

"Foreign Policy, Intelligence, Bureaucracies, and Other Things" (2 1/2 hrs), Ambassador Robert Komer;

"Strategic Military Intelligence: Producers, Consumers, and Evaluation" (1 1/2 hrs), Bruce Clarke, C/OSR.

One day was devoted to "Supporting U.S. Foreign Policy: The Middle East Example," consisting of the following:

"Coordinating US Middle East Policy," Hal Saunders, Senior Member, NSC Staff;

"Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis," Charles DiBona, Special Consultant to the President;

STAT "The Agency Role," Panel:
[redacted] (Chairman),
Special Assistant to the DCI



STAT

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

The interface between CIA and the policy-makers was addressed in a panel, "Supporting Our Bosses—In Washington and Elsewhere" (2 1/2 hrs). The panelists included [] C/NARCOG, discussing intelligence support to BNDD, and [], C/NEA/OCI, describing direct OCI assistance to the NSC.

[] AD/DCI/IC, in "Community Trends and Key Problems" (1 1/2 hrs), emphasized the new approaches the IC Staff would take to make the Community more responsive to NSC needs. He was followed by Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham (USA), C/Product Review Group/IC, on "Intelligence Priorities and Product Evaluation" (1 1/2 hrs).

STATINTL

Remaining segments relevant to the intelligence process were organizational/functional in form. One day was devoted to the views of their Community roles by representatives from DOD, NSA and INR (State). In the final days of the course, [] ExDir/NPIC, discussed the NPIC role. Then each Deputy Director addressed the responsibilities and concerns of his directorate, and finally the DCI reflected on the Agency and Community today.

STATINTL

STATINTL

The AIS devotes the greatest proportion of its schedule to the issues of the intelligence process among OTR's cross-directorate courses. The particular concern with intelligence-policy relationships is evident. The courses's short duration precludes formal exploitation of the wide range of student experiences, but informal exchanges are especially encouraged during the three days at [] and three days at []

D. Senior Seminar

(Nine week course for select senior Agency officers, GS-15/17)

The Senior Seminar combines the organizational/functional and problem/process approaches in studying the intelligence cycle and policy-making process. With the exception of ISTS programs, the Seminar is the most rigorous OTR program in exploring new methodologies with possible application to intelligence analysis or the management of intelligence resources. The senior and select composition of the class, its size limitation (20), and the length of the course enable

the Seminar to deal with a broad range of issues relating to intelligence and policy at an advanced level. The Seminar is also able to exploit student expertise in the design of its formal schedule.

In earlier course descriptions, the term "organizational/functional" has normally referred to presentations emphasizing basic organization and mission characteristics. In the Seminar, organizational/functional presentations focus on current roles and trends in organization and mission, citing the impacts of new priorities and technologies.

Fifty-one presentations were selected from the last schedule as having relevance to this paper. The scope notes for each are in Tab A. The following summary highlights only those elements considered particularly unique.

Block II, THE BUSINESS OF CIA, singles out a very selective array of topics concerning CIA's primary missions and tasks. The morning devoted to "Intelligence Guidance" and "The Analytical Function in CIA" is of special interest. "Intelligence Guidance" (1 1/2 hrs) was given by [redacted]

STATINTL

STATINTL

[redacted] Seminar member, who described and evaluated how the Agency seeks to align its programs and activities with the valid needs of policy-makers through its intelligence guidance systems. [redacted] also considered trends in CIA's overall approach to information requirements and assessments of collection systems.

STATINTL

"The Analytical Function in CIA" (2 hrs) was a joint presentation by [redacted] C/WH/OCI and David Brandwein, D/FMSAC detailing the processes by which information inputs become a conclusion or estimate concerning foreign capabilities, policies, intentions and strategies. Each also discussed management responsibilities for the production of the most sophisticated and objective finished intelligence.

STATINTL

The problem/process approach was applied to the areas of narcotics and arms control. "Narcotics Intelligence: New Task for CIA" (2 hrs) discussed both collection and production responsibilities in support of U.S. foreign policy. Panelists were [redacted] C/NARCOG and [redacted], DDI Coordinator on International Narcotics Matters. "Intelligence and Arms Control" (2 hrs) was a panel of CIA intelligence

STATINTL

STATINTL

officers tracing the steps to SALT I and the continuing responsibilities of CIA and the Community in support of verification and prospective future agreements.

Block III, NEW METHODOLOGIES OF INTEREST TO INTELLIGENCE, devoted one week to an overview of the new methodologies for intelligence analysis and the management of intelligence resources. Methodologies receiving more detailed attention were probability estimates utilizing Baye's Theorem, simulation and modelling, and net assessment. CIA's response to the challenge of new approaches was discussed in "Exploration of New Methodologies in the CS" (2 hrs), "US-USSR Strategic Balance: Measuring Strategic Power" (2 hrs), "Future Weapons Systems" (1 1/4 hrs), and a panel on "Implications of New Methodologies for CIA" (2 hrs), consisting of [redacted] C/SRS (Chairman), [redacted] (then) DCI/IC/PRG, and [redacted] (then) O/DDS&T.

In Block IV, THE U.S. AND A CHANGING WORLD, trends in foreign and national security policies and recent developments in international affairs affecting intelligence work were stressed.

Seminar member [redacted] discussed "Intelligence and the Indo-Pakistan War" (1 1/4 hrs), relating CIA's record in providing intelligence support to the policy-makers.

The Middle East was the setting for presentations by [redacted] Staff Member, NSC and [redacted] Seminar member---"Middle East: Case Study in Policy Formulation" (2 hrs) and "Middle East: Case Study in Intelligence Support" (1 1/2 hrs).

Block V, CIA'S OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS, focused on our relations within the Community and with the NSC system. One day was spent at State Department, studying the Department's role within the USIB and NSC systems and its relations with

STATINTL

CIA. DOD relations were treated in the presentation by James P. Morris, Assistant for Strategic Systems Analysis/ISA/DOD, who evaluated intelligence inputs and particularly the CIA contribution to policy-making in the field of international security affairs. Gerard Burke, Executive Secretary, PFIAB, discussed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's role in monitoring the entire U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

[] Seminar member, described the workings of a USIB Committee in formulating collection requirements and using the intelligence product for its inputs into national estimates which may ultimately influence policy decisions. As Chairman of the Space Working Group of USIB's Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, his concern was the Soviet space program.

The quality and experience of the Seminar members help make this course the most effective in getting to the core of the functioning of the intelligence process within CIA and the Community. Other courses do not enjoy students with this level of responsibility and experience within the Agency, or working relationships within the Community. The course is particularly effective in studying the interface between collector and analyst or producer.

E. Intelligence Production Course (IPC)

(Eight week course for selected junior analysts and CTs being assigned to the DDI)

The Intelligence Production Course prepares young Agency professionals for the production of finished intelligence. (Some students may be assigned to DDI offices not involved in such production.) The course design reflects two basic assumptions:

1. Effective analysts must understand the total intelligence process from requirement to product and end use, and
2. They must appreciate the methods and responsibilities of other Community members responsible for collection and/or production. The significance of this is particularly understood by those in analytical positions whose products may require coordination with counterparts within the Community.

The intelligence process is covered in greatest depth in this course.

STATINTL

The schedule carried the students through the cycle from sessions on requirements with [] of the IC and with the Intelligence Requirements Staff/DDI to the offices of the National Security Council staff. The small class size (10-15) encouraged informal lecture/discussion formats in sessions with Community intelligence officers representing all levels—senior managers, desk chiefs and working analysts.

The entire schedule followed organizational/functional lines, as one objective is to give students a clear understanding of the responsibilities of each component in the cycle within Agency and Community.

Within the Agency, detailed briefings were given by representatives of all components in the cycle, including DDS&T offices. These were supplemented by tours of Agency facilities (the entire CRS complex, NPIC and IAS, DCS headquarters and a field station, the Cable Secretariat, OEL, OER, OBG, OSI, and OCI, including the CIA Operations Center).

Community facilities visited were Vint Hill Station (Army Security Agency), State Department Operations Center and policy desks, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, NSA, DIA, the National Military Command and Intelligence Centers and ISA of the Department of Defense, the White House Situation Room and the NSC. The visits included briefings and where feasible, discussions with analysts. Each student is also expected to arrange personal interviews with analysts in CIA and the Community in his own field of interest. The objectives of this are to gain knowledge of sources used, analytical methodologies, products and consumers for each organization responsible for finished intelligence, and personal contact with potential counterparts for later coordination.

The ISTS faculty provided one week on new analytical methodologies at their facility in Anacostia.

The course concluded with an address by Paul Walsh, ADD/I, on "The DDI in Support of Policy."

As noted earlier, the IPC provides the most comprehensive study of the intelligence process at the working level. The goal of training analysts is conceived as a broad educational responsibility, and not merely skills training.

III. THE OPERATIONS SCHOOL

A. Information Reporting, Reports and Requirements (IRRR)

(Three week course for DDO professionals)

The Information Reporting, Reports and Requirements course is a skills course for the training of reports officers. Consequently major concentration is on lectures and exercises on the skills required. The broader elements of the intelligence cycle are considered where directly relevant to reporting from the field. These focus on the requirements process and the ultimate consumer of field reporting, and are as follows:

STATINTL

"Requirements and Evaluation Roundup"
(1 hr), [REDACTED]

STATINTL

"The Relationship Between the CS and
DDI Regarding Intelligence Reporting
Evaluations and Customer Service"
(1 1/2 hrs), [REDACTED] Research
Officer, ME/OCI;

STATINTL

"Intelligence Guidance" (1 hr, 20 min),
[REDACTED] C/WH [REDACTED]

STATINTL

STATINTL

"Dissemination of Reports on Narcotics
Production or Traffic" (1 hr, 20 min),
[REDACTED] DDO/NARCOG;

STATINTL

"Realistic View of Requirements"
[REDACTED]

The other courses given by the Operations School do not give explicit attention to the cycle or policy-making process. They are essentially skills or orientation courses, and relevant presentations would be restricted to functional aspects of collection requirements, methods and reporting.

This applies to the following courses:

1. Operations Support
2. Soviet Bloc Operations
3. Information Reports Familiarization
4. Covert Action Operations Seminar
5. Introduction to Covert Action

The assumption is that students will have received broader coverage of these processes in one or more of the SIWA courses.

STATINTL

IV.

A. Basic Operations Course (BOC)

(Sixteen week course for junior DDO officers and CTs entering the DDO)

The Basic Operations Course is "the basic training course" for an operations officer. The emphasis is on lecture introducing or complementing field exercises in

STATINTL

One lecture and exercise with possible policy-making implications concerned Executive Secretary, 40 Committee, presented a two-hour

STATINTL

STATINTL

B. Advanced Operations Course (AOC)

(Eight week course for DDO officers)

The Advanced Operations Course is for those who have already served in the field. The objective is to upgrade their skills in all phases of clandestine operations. The format is lecture/exercise. In the fourth week, three lectures dealt with broad aspects of the interface between intelligence and policy-making. These were:

"Assessment of Intelligence Collection
Activities of the Operations Directorate
and What They Produce" (1 hr, 45 min),
[redacted] C/FI;

STATINTL

"The Function of the NSC and the Significance
of Intelligence in Its Operations"
(1 hr, 45 min), [redacted]
Executive Secretary, 40 Committee;

STATINTL

"The Agency's Role in Support of the
Formulation of National Security
Policy" (1 1/2 hrs), Paul Walsh,
ADD/I.

As noted for the Operations School, the assumption is that students will have received broader coverage of the intelligence and foreign policy-making processes in one or more of the SIWA courses.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

These conclusions and recommendations are to the question, "Does OTR cover the intelligence process and policy-making process?" The focus is on our demonstrated capacity. A second question of how effective this is done in each course in the context of its objectives should be addressed by the course chairmen and the Curriculum Council.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The immediate question has three basic components:

1. The intelligence process within CIA;
2. The intelligence process within the Community, including both interrelationships and distinctive approaches (sources, analysis, consumers) of other Community members producing finished intelligence (e.g., INR, DIA).
3. The policy-making process, or rather, processes. The expanding range of concerns (e.g., narcotics, international economic issues) and the growing number of Departments and Agencies involved in policy-making complicates any precise "policy-making process" definition. Add to this the distinctive styles of each President since the National Security Act of 1947.

I contend that SIWA courses do provide a basic understanding of the intelligence process within the Agency, whether the approach be essentially organizational/functional or problem/process. Both approaches have limitations, and some combination is probably most desirable. The organizational/functional approach may "block out" the process too neatly—requirements to collectors to processors to analysts, without the continual interface between collector and analyst clearly shown.

The organizational/functional approach also may result in distorted images, as component representatives may draw an ideal picture of the responsibilities and abilities of their offices. This distorting is most likely to occur in the IWA, when the speaker is not challenged by experienced students. A strength of the problems/process approach is the demonstration of the continuing collector-analyst relationship. One criticism, particularly as applied to a basic orientation course, is the possibility of not providing adequate appreciation of the broad role of a particular component.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The intelligence process within the Community is treated in depth only in the IPC. Apart from the Senior Seminar's one day at State, the treatment of other Community members has been limited to single presentations by representatives. These representatives also may be inclined to idealize the role and effectiveness of their organization.

STATINTL

In most courses, the treatment of the policy-making process has been limited to one or a combination of the following: an overview by [redacted] SIWA; a description of the NSC system by Mrs. Jeanne Davis from the Council; problem/process considerations of direct CIA interface with the policy-maker.

I recommend that SIWA prepare studies in depth on the three component issues cited—the intelligence process within CIA; the intelligence process within the Community, covering the considerations cited above; and the foreign policy-making process. The time is appropriate for the first two studies, given the changes in emphasis and style—including the "new face" of the Intelligence Community Staff, new formats for finished intelligence, etc.

*24 Nov 73
where
do these
stand?*

The study of the policy-making process should attempt to sort out the constant elements from the peculiar styles of successive Presidents. The three papers should then serve as the base for review of present course content, and be regularly revised.

STATINTL

[redacted]

5 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Addendum to 3 July 1973 Paper, "Coverage of
the Intelligence and Policy-Making
Processes in OTR Courses"

1. As I reviewed OTR courses for the cited paper, the conclusions and recommendations for in-depth studies became obvious. As a consequence, the need for such papers emerged as a stated fact, rather than a reasoned (on paper) fact. In rereading the final paper as a consumer, I began asking the "why" questions that should have been treated in the original. This addendum anticipates some of those "whys".

2. "Why more paper?"

First, this is not to criticize the present objectives and schedules of OTR courses, and particularly those of SIWA. Reacting as objectively and dispassionately as possible, I found that my colleagues exercised great skill and imagination in designing blocks and scheduling speakers to give not only the form but the taste of the intelligence process in CIA and CIA's involvement in "the policy process."

Second, I do not believe any course answers the subject question directly. This suggests we change the question itself to "Is there A policy-making process or A clearly definable intelligence process?" We can relate ways in which CIA has given support to the President and Dr. Kissinger, but our involvement in intelligence and policy processes is much more complex--if treated on the basis of the continuing sources of requirements and consumption tasking our resources. The word "processes" may be more realistic, and documenting that might encourage us to exploit other Community members differently in our courses. At least the studies will improve SIWA's in-house capability to deal with the issues of intelligence and policy. To date, the matter has largely been left in the able but possibly over-taxed shoulders of our briefing officers, [redacted]

[redacted]

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

Third, in-depth papers can be the basis for shorter handouts in existing courses where scheduling precludes more formal attention to the processes--particularly those of the Operations School and [redacted]. The assumption in recommending staffing of in-depth papers to SIWA is that these will require at least six months, including the opportunity for the responsible faculty members to audit the next runnings of the Midcareer, AIS, and Senior Seminar courses.

Fourth, the matter of "national foreign policy-making process" is complex by any definition. Even before delving into recent behaviorialist studies, I would suggest interested parties compare the process as outlined in the following popular assessments:

(Brochure) Department of State, "How Foreign Policy Is Made"

(Book) Frank von der Linden, NIXON'S QUEST FOR PEACE, 1972

(Article) Tad Szulc, "The Great American Foreign Policy Machine," The Washingtonian, June 1973

The real, as opposed to the ideal or statutory roles of the members of the Intelligence Community, are not always clear. This fact at the Executive level, plus the growing array of Agencies and Departments involved in the policy process, explains the need for careful study to determine the one or the many "processes" to which CIA contributes.

And, finally, why staff the paper to SIWA?

First, SIWA has the broadest collection of experience, from earlier Agency experiences and from the continuing responsibilities for planning and auditing courses.

And, finally, SIWA faculty members have developed a core of contacts throughout the Community to exploit in sifting out the practical roles of Community members.

STATINTL

